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Abstract—Many airports around the world are actively con-
sidering development or expansion projects. Such projects can
spur tremendous benefits but are investment-intensive and span
several decades from conception to completion. We formulate the
associated dynamic, complex decision-making problems using a
broad systems frame. We propose a conceptual framework that
links airport infrastructure investments and airport management
and operations in a time-expanded, state-contingent problem.
To develop this framework we consider the social and policy
objectives for well functioning air transportation infrastructure,
the decision levers available to stakeholders, the influence of the
institutional field and regulatory context on these decisions, and
the key performance measures that operationalize system ilities.
Our framework integrates literature from investments under
uncertainty, airport demand management, and airport operating
procedures. Four case examples of airports in Delhi, Charlotte,
London and New York illustrate decision-making in the context
of our framework. We argue for a more integrated approach
to decision-making while evaluating investments in greenfield
airports or capacity expansions.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the value to society of investing in a new airport,
upgrading brownfield facilities, or better utilizing those facili-
ties? How do the trade-offs between these decisions influence
performance? Are these decisions separable or coupled and
to what extent do the choices depend on the project’s insti-
tutional field? Keeney and Raiffa have asked these questions
in the context of the complex decision problem of developing
airport facilities for Mexico City [1]. The problem is complex
because the decision-makers must balance multiple objectives:
minimizing costs, increasing capacity, enhancing safety, pro-
moting airline competition, mitigating environmental impact,
and enabling regional development. Many airports worldwide
currently face these challenges at different stages of their
lifecycle.
While the decision-making problem faced by airports
around the world remains similar to Keeney and Raiffa’s
original framing, some streams of literature and policy di-
alogue often treat the multiple objectives as independent
and decoupled. Analytical tractability is a good motivation
for this intentional decoupling. The research community and
practitioners have been able to make great strides in areas such
as evaluating irreversible investments in real airport assets,
enhancing airport project organizations, the design of demand
management mechanisms and the development of innovative
operating procedures. We believe, however, that a very focused
view often obscures the system-level considerations, and limits
our understanding of how decisions impact outcomes.
Since many airports around the world are actively consid-
ering development or expansion projects, our motivation is
to revisit the formulation of this dynamic, complex decision-
making problem using a broader systems frame. We propose
a conceptual framework that links airport infrastructure in-
vestments and airport management and operations in a time-
expanded, state-contingent problem. To develop this frame-
work we consider the social and policy objectives for well
functioning air transportation infrastructure, the decision levers
available to stakeholders, the influence of the institutional
field and regulatory context on these decisions, and the key
measures or indicators of system performance.
We select the airport as the unit of analysis. The system
boundary is necessarily loosely defined to include both the
physical and technological infrastructure assets (technical), as
well as the organization responsible for the airport’s manage-
ment and operations (organizational). This approach puts us
squarely in the realm of socio-technical systems, relating our
work to the underpinning theme of this forum.
The rest of this introductory section completes the motiva-
tion. Section II provides a brief critical review of the relevant
literature. Section III describes our conceptual framework.
Section IV illustrates the issues with comparative case studies
of airports from Delhi, Charlotte, London and New York.
Section V concludes.
A. Airports as an investment for meeting social objectives
Airports create value for society by enabling connectivity.
An airport is a sophisticated system that is in place to
ultimately provide services to individuals, businesses [2], and
governments [3]. Demand for airport services is derived from
the broader market for air transport, which makes airlines an
important client of airports. The economic value of an airport
is the sum of the direct value of the aviation activities it
enables, indirect value from commercial activities at or near
the airport, and induced economic activity in the region [4, 5].
Airports can have an important economic “multiplier effect”
through agglomeration [6], thereby contributing to regional
economic growth. As gateways to national capitals and urban
zones, airports also have a unique reputational significance.
B. Airports as a context for capital investment, management
and operations decision-making
We categorize decision-making into three broad categories:
investment, management and operations. Capital investments
in and financing of airports is the first major category [7], and
such decisions are closely tied to the planning effort [8, 9].
Investments can take the form of brownfield expansion and
upgrades (e.g., the construction of a new runway, the expan-
sion of passenger terminal buildings), or greenfield airport
development [10, 11]. Investments can also take the form of
developing air traffic management technologies [12, 13].
In the second category, managing airport infrastructure
involves the design of a demand management mechanism
for allocating capacity to the airlines. There are important
jurisdictional policy differences in this regard. Most of the
busy airports worldwide operate under slot control policies,
carefully allocating valuable airport capacity, to prevent flight
schedules from exceeding capacity. Airports declare a value of
capacity and allocate a corresponding number of slots, typi-
cally through a bi-annual administrative procedure. In contrast,
policy in the US weakly constrains airline access to airports
[14]. Only the three New York airports (JFK, EWR and LGA)
operate under schedule limits, albeit loosely enforced, often
through voluntary compliance from the airlines. These policy
differences affect the behavior and performance of airports as
systems.
Finally, the third category covers airport operations. It
consists of utilizing available infrastructure to taxi and operate
the flights, and move passengers, ground crews and service
vehicles. The underlying objective is to maximize the airport’s
operating efficiency, while satisfying safety requirements. Sec-
tion II unpacks decision-making in these three categories in
more detail.
C. Airports as a manifestation of institutional field
Airports exist in an institutional field—an environment with
a unique combination of norms, regulatory rules and laws,
and cultural approaches to decision-making [15]. These envi-
ronmental features play out in the strategic planning process
(different guidelines and process for master planning [9]),
the technical design attributes of an airport (e.g., the design
of aircraft contact points [16]), airline access to the airport
(different approaches to airport demand management, high-
lighted above), and airport operations (e.g., different degrees
of privatization of Air Navigation Service Providers [17]). An
important crosscutting theme across these areas is the role of
the private sector in building, owning, managing and operating
airports. In the US, while the private sector is intimately
involved at many large airports, the public sector still owns
the land, or is directly responsible for airport planning and
operations where the public authority model is in use. Airport
privatizations in countries like the UK, France and Spain imply
that the private sector has end-to-end responsibility typically
under very long term concession agreements. The degree of
privatization of airport services creates incentives and allocates
risks, affecting how and when capacity expansion may occur,
and the level and quality of airport services [18, 19, 20].
D. Airports as systems with emergent performance
An airport as a system has many sub-systems, each of
which contributes to its overall performance. Best practice
suggests that there are many indicators that airport organi-
zations should use to monitor airport performance [21, 22].
Some of these are core indicators and measure performance
of the airport as a whole (e.g., safety, airfield operations, on-
time performance, cargo, financial, parking, service quality),
whereas others reside at the sub-system level (e.g., airfield
electricity consumption, employee job satisfaction). The many
departmental sub-systems interact to result in the airport’s
overall emergent behavior. In Section III, we link performance
metrics to desirable system properties, or “ilities”, which are
derived from social and policy objectives.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Airport infrastructure planning is an example of a broader
class of problems involving irreversible investments in real
assets under uncertainty [23]. Airports are long-horizon
relationship-specific investments; once stakeholders have com-
mitted and infrastructure is built, the project cannot be easily
redeployed without extensive sunk costs, time and effort [24].
The problem can be formulated as a multi-objective, multi-
stakeholder, time-expanded decision. A planner’s viewpoint
focuses on enhancing social value or welfare [1, 25]. A firm’s
view translates to wealth maximization, i.e., maximization of
the net present value of future returns and investment oppor-
tunities. The planner’s multi-objective frame can subsume the
firm’s single objective view, but this creates trade-offs. In a real
options sense, the first investment (in a new airport) unlocks
the option to invest in future growth opportunities. For firms,
this can create a competitive game-theoretic situation, since
airports nearby can capture rents in the context of growing
demand in the region [26]. An airport’s expansion strategy
may thus conflict with the planner’s overall intent to enhance
welfare in the region. Finally, the problem of investment
recovery raises similar trade-offs related to the endogeneity in
airport-related taxes and fees and how they impact passenger
decisions [27].
The problem is complicated by the significant uncertainty
affecting the potential value of an airport, including uncertain-
ties regarding demand for air transport [28], passenger travel
choices [29], and fuel price volatility [30]. This uncertainty
underscores two critical features of the infrastructure planning
problem. First, Bayesian learning takes places through the
use of information on uncertainties and competitors’ actions
revealed over time [31]. Second, a flexible airport design might
enable follow on investments and actions as future uncertain-
ties resolve. A growing literature on flexibility in design [32]
and project governance addresses the design process needed
to operationalize flexibility in airport projects [33, 16].
The broader literature on access regulation [34] deals with
the problem of airport demand management, trading off ca-
pacity utilization and flexible airline competition with on-
time performance. On the one hand, slot control policies
may underuse available capacity [35] and create barriers to
airline competition [36, 37]. On the other, the unrestricted
approach to airport access in the US causes significant delays,
imposing costs on airlines, passengers and other stakeholders
[38]. This trade-off has created important research questions.
The operations vein quantifies airport capacity [39, 40] and
models the effects of demand management on airline schedules
[41, 42] and on airport congestion [43, 44]. The economic
vein studies how the use of airport infrastructure by competing
profit-maximizing operators creates the potential for conges-
tion externalities. The “tragedy of the commons” issue arises
because airlines sometimes might have incentives to overuse
the airport as a public resource by scheduling more flights
than available capacity. The economic literature aims to design
welfare-maximizing capacity allocation strategies, given the
specificities of the airline industry and of airline competition
[45, 46, 47].
Finally, the problem of airport capacity utilization involves
designing operating procedures to enhance the efficiency of
airport operations, for a given physical airport layout and a
given schedule of flights. First, the Air Traffic Flow Man-
agement (ATFM) literature designs a set of tactical inter-
ventions to optimize the flow of aircraft at the national or
regional level. Interventions of this type include the control of
runway configurations at major airports, the ground holding
of aircraft and the optimization of en-route operations (see,
e.g., [48, 49, 50, 51]). Second, the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
literature aims to optimize the sequencing and spacing of
aircraft at the operational level [52]. The combination of the
two approaches reduces the magnitude and costs of flight
delays substantially, while satisfying equity considerations
across airlines [53].
In conclusion, a number of academic communities have
addressed the problems of planning, managing and operating
airport infrastructure. Their efforts have undoubtedly resulted
in important research advances and practice improvements.
The different bodies of work are quite disintegrated however.
Infrastructure planning primarily uses high-level traffic fore-
casts and does not incorporate the endogenous links between
airport infrastructure and airline schedules, airport operating
procedures. Airport demand management generally relies on a
single-value estimate of airport capacity and thus treats airport
infrastructure and operating procedures as constant. Airport
operations focus on tactical and operational interventions,
given a physical airport layout and for a given schedule of
flights. In this paper, we argue for a more integrated approach
that acknowledges the close links between these different
levels of analysis and intervention.
III. PROBLEM CONCEPTUALIZATION
A. Conceptual Representation of Airport System Performance
The problem of infrastructure planning, management and
operations involves defining social objectives, monitoring the
system’s performance trajectory, and intervening to keep it in
line with desirable social outcomes. Assessing the “perfor-
mance” of any complex socio-technical system is challenging
because it encompasses several, often competing dimensions,
diverse stakeholder perspectives, and spans multiple time
scales. In this section, we unpack several design and structural
features of airports as systems and conceptually represent how
those features can enhance performance.
We discuss system performance using the concept of ilities,
defined as “desired properties of systems [. . . ] that often man-
ifest themselves after a system has been put to its initial use
[and that] concern wider system impacts with respect to time
and stakeholder” [54]. We identify the following emergent
properties as critical to airport performance. The list is neither
exhaustive nor unique. We simply intend to characterize the
competing objectives that stakeholders of airport systems face
worldwide.
• Safety: As the foremost responsibility of civil aviation
authorities, safety is paramount in any air traffic manage-
ment system. Records show that airports have achieved
extraordinary safety levels in recent decades [55].
• Efficiency: The number of flights operating at an airport,
per unit of time, characterize its efficiency and imply
its realized capacity. Efficiency is often measured as the
maximum throughput capacity, defined as the average
number of aircraft movements that can be operated per
unit of time under continuous demand [16].
• Reliability: The airport’s ability to provide high levels of
service consistently indicates its reliability. Schedule re-
liability characterizes its ability to operate its schedule of
flights, as measured through diverse on-time performance
metrics (e.g., arrival delay, taxiing delay, etc.).
• Flexibility: Airports are subject to dramatic and unex-
pected changes in the airline industry (e.g., mergers, hub
developments, frequency competition) that create signifi-
cant forecast uncertainty. Flexibility defines the system’s
ability to accommodate short-term volatility and long-
term structural variations in traffic. It encompasses the
notions of scalability and adaptability.
• Scalability: This is the ability of an airport system to
scale up to increasing demand over long periods of
time. A given airport design must typically serve its
functions over many decades. It thus has to anticipate and
accommodate growth (or declines) in traffic and demand.
• Adaptability: This is the ability of an airport to re-
spond to shorter-term variations in airline demand, e.g.,
airline market penetration, frequency competition, etc.
The airport’s adaptability depends on how quickly and
effectively it manages to adapt to such variations.
• Sustainability: This system property is often defined as
the 3 “E”s: Economic development, Environmental pro-
tection, social Equity. Sustaining high levels of Economic
growth is related to other airport properties (e.g., effi-
ciency, scalability). The airport must minimize its local
(e.g., noise) and global (e.g., emissions) environmental
footprints. Aligning organizational goals with the needs
Fig. 1: A conceptual framework linking airport system decisions to performance metrics and system ’ilities’
and values of local communities is the social component
of sustainability.
Complex interactions exist among these properties. Some
are positively correlated and improvements in one may there-
fore lead to improvements in others. For instance, reduced de-
lays may improve reliability as well as positively impact safety
and sustainability. There also exist trade-offs across other
dimensions; traffic growth can increase peak-hour scheduling
levels, for example. Airports may thus see enhanced incentives
to improve their operating efficiency (number of flights per
unit time) but cascading delays will lower schedule reliability.
We can think of most airport capacity restrictions as limita-
tions in their scalability, i.e., system failures to meet increasing
demand. This is the main cause of airport congestion, implying
low schedule reliability and diversions of traffic. Many busy
airports worldwide thus face the critical challenge of designing
investments and managerial and operational interventions to
mitigate the demand-capacity imbalance.
We present in Figure 1 a general framework linking con-
cepts of airport system decisions to performance metrics and
emergent ’ilities’. Squares represent decision levers, whereas
ovals represent the observed behaviors. The framework spans
several time frames with strategic, tactical and operational
interventions, along with a number of stakeholders. The insti-
tutional field in which the airport system is embedded shapes
the system’s behavior.
The first decision lever consists of investing in physical
and/or technological infrastructure. Such projects expand air-
port capacity, and thus the supply of infrastructure. The second
lever consists of designing or modifying a demand manage-
ment mechanism to better match airline flight schedules with
available airport capacity. This mechanism can be administra-
tive (e.g., slot control) or economic (e.g., congestion pricing,
slot auctions). It affects airline scheduling incentives and thus
flight schedules, i.e., demand for airport infrastructure. The
third lever consists of enhancing the efficiency of airport
operations through improvements in operating procedures,
namely Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) procedures at
the tactical level and Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures at
the operational level.
These three types of intervention are tightly interconnected.
On the supply side, the physical and technological capacity
of the airport strongly constrain its operating procedures.
Any investment in airport infrastructure is likely to allevi-
ate these constraints and thus improve system performance.
Airport operating procedures are not exogenous however;
they depend on the physical layout of the airport, on the
surrounding airspace and on the characteristics of the air
traffic management systems. Infrastructure investments will
thus also spur a number of iterative improvements in air traffic
management to make the best possible use of capacity. In
other words, infrastructure enhancements attempt to increase
potential airport capacity, while operating procedures aim to
maximize effective airport capacity. Given the complexity of
air traffic management systems and the endogeneity of airport
operating procedures, there is no clear mapping between ex
ante infrastructure investment (potential capacity) and ex post
impact on airport operations (effective capacity).
On the demand side, airlines’ networks and flight sched-
ules also depend endogenously on effective airport capacity.
Infrastructure investments and operational enhancements may
attract airline traffic at an airport, but their exact consequences
on flight schedules are difficult to predict because they depend
on airline business strategies that also evolve. Conversely,
infrastructure investments and airport operations depend on
how airlines are making use of available capacity. For instance,
airport capacity depends on the mix of aircraft used by the
airlines, while capacity utilization procedures will depend on
how arrivals and departures are scheduled over the course of a
day. In the short run, airline scheduling decisions will impact
airport operations, whereas the evolution of airline demand
in a metropolitan area will motivate long run infrastructure
investments. In summary, the planning, management and op-
erations of airport infrastructure are not stand-alone problems
but are linked by the irreversibility of physical infrastructure,
sunk economic costs of previous investments, and complex,
endogenous and multi-stakeholder dynamics.
We can get a sense of an airport system’s behavior in
terms of the “ilities” presented above by observing its perfor-
mance metrics. Whereas a specific intervention may directly
result in some properties, many observed behaviors emerge
from unintended consequences of investments and decisions.
Moreover, airport planning, management and operations are
dynamic problems that span many years of operations. For
this reason, we add feedback loops that dynamically revise
capacity estimates and inform airline schedule planning, based
on observed system performance. In turn, system performance
also informs, at a higher level, future infrastructure investments
and demand management policies.
Finally, we emphasize that the system’s behavior strongly
depends on the institutional field and regulatory environment
in which the airport is embedded. Factors such as the extent
of competition in the airline industry, the degree of centraliza-
tion in infrastructure planning and management, the mandate
of civil aviation authorities to impose demand management
measures, will influence the dynamics and performance of the
airport system.
B. A Representation of the Decision-Making Problem
Having unpacked the interdependencies, we address in this
section the dynamic nature of the decision-making problem.
Infrastructure investments present a well known natural trade-
off in which significant system benefits accruing over a long
horizon are available only if investments costs and resources
are expended in the near term. The many possible benefits
include better using technology and skilled professional la-
bor, enabling market penetration and airline competition by
reducing pressure on flight schedules, and meeting regional
development goals by supporting long-term traffic growth.
These benefits accrue after undertaking investment projects
spanning several decades from conception to completion,
subject to environmental, socioeconomic and political con-
straints. Further, costs and benefits are multidimensional and
uncertain and a diverse set of stockholders may perceive them
differently. We use decision tress to characterize the nature
and timing of the decisions, first for a new greenfield airport
and then for capacity expansion at existing airports.
A greenfield airport project involves deciding whether to
build (yes or no), what to build (the airport’s design), and
when to build (timing of construction). Figure 2 is a schematic
representation of the greenfield airport problem. Squares de-
notes decision choices or options, and circles correspond to
observed outcomes. The decision tree structure assumes a
discrete repetition of observations followed by decisions (e.g.,
decisions and observations are made every year), but the
dynamics of the system are more continuous in reality. Each
decision choice brings associated costs and benefits, which
depend on the state of the system at the time of the decision.
Our stylized decision space includes (i) a “Do Nothing” option
to represent the status quo, (ii) the investment in learning
through activities such as a research study, a feasibility study,
etc. (“Exploration”), (iii) the investment in alternative tech-
Fig. 2: The decision tree for a greenfield project with a range of
options to represent the opportunity cost of infrastructure investments
nologies or projects (“Alternative”) and (iv) the construction
of a new airport with a specific design concept (“Greenfield”).
We select these options to emphasize the opportunity cost of
any infrastructure investment and motivate the use of a broad
system boundary to capture a diverse set of interests.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis argues that stakeholders
should invest if the expected discounted reward exceeds pro-
jected discounted costs. In our case, both expected rewards and
costs will depend on the specific design concept, e.g., plans
for the size of passenger buildings, the number and layout of
runways, ability to expand in future, etc. Since infrastructure
development is tied to social, political and organizational
objectives, the stakeholder’s viewpoint (welfare-maximizing
vs. wealth-maximizing) and the contractual structure of the
project will also influence the project’s payoffs.
The question of when to build considers the nature and ex-
tent of uncertainty in both the costs and benefits of the project.
On the one hand, early investments may result in a larger Net
Present Value if the project is ready and available to capture
the benefits of the demand that materializes. On the other,
delaying the decision to build may be valuable in some cases.
This potential “value of waiting” stems from two factors: the
irreversibility and path dependency of long-term investments,
and the dynamic resolution of uncertainties over time. First,
since relationship-specific investment decisions cannot be eas-
ily reversed, a decision to build commits the system to a course
of action, thereby closing of the other decision alternatives.
Figure 2 depicts this irreversible commitment by the absence
of control over the system when a greenfield airport is being
constructed. Note that building in flexibility in the design
of the system may enable certain dynamic controls [16] and
alleviate concerns, but the trade-off remains in the sense that
executing a build decision thereafter considerably restricts the
set of options available to the decision-makers. Second, the
dynamic resolution of uncertainty over time impacts the opti-
mal timing of infrastructure decisions. The following example
illustrates this. Let’s assume that a project costs 100 units
“today”, and the value of the project “tomorrow” is 200 units
with a certain probability p and 50 units with probability
1− p. The net present value of the project, an expectation,
is equal to: NPV = −100+ r(200p+ 50(1− p)), where r is
the discount factor. The traditional approach suggests that the
decision-maker should execute if the expected NPV is positive.
Assuming that the uncertainty regarding the reward is resolved
in the next “period”, the best strategy would consist of waiting
one period, and undertaking the project if the value of the
project is found to be 200 units. This logic extends over a
number of time periods. This very simple example illustrates
two important points. First, the “value of waiting” depends on
the nature and extent of uncertainty. Second, it also depends
on how quickly and certainly uncertainty gets resolved.
We also distinguish between two types of uncertainty: ran-
dom shocks and structural uncertainty. Random shocks are the
exogenous sources of uncertainty, such as changing technology
costs, population and economic growth. Structural uncertainty,
in contrast, is the uncertainty endogenous to the project, e.g.,
project feasibility, future costs, demand for infrastructure, etc.
Both types can be of a technical, social or organizational
nature. In our framework, the ”Do nothing option” is a way to
capitalize primarily on the potential resolution of exogenous
uncertainty. The Exploration option may address both types of
uncertainty. The cost of revealing information and resolving
uncertainties is relatively minor in comparison with the sunk
costs of investment due to a build decision.
In summary, we have stylized the investment in a green-
field airport as a dynamic decision-making problem with a
long-term investment option and short-term non-investment
alternatives. The former can spur tremendous benefits of new
infrastructure, but comes at significant cost and represents a
technological and organization commitment that spans many
decades. The latter category aims to leverage the value of
waiting and learning.
We now consider the problem of capacity expansion at
an existing, capacity-constrained airport subject to signifi-
cant delays and growing demand. The corresponding stylized
decision problem in Figure 3 shows four decision options:
(i) a status quo “Do nothing” option as in the previous
greenfield airport case, (ii) changes in the demand management
rules (“Demand Management”), (iii) operational enhancements
resulting from investments in the Air Traffic Management
system (“ATFM/ATC Investments”) and (iv) the expansion of
existing infrastructure (“Capacity Expansion”). For the sake of
clarity, we omit the “Exploration” and “Alternative” options
shown in Figure 2, but these options are also available as
above. Figure 2 and Figure 3 are quite similar, exhibiting over-
laps between the greenfield project and brownfield expansion
problem such as the irreversibility of infrastructure decisions
and the role of uncertainty in decision-making. However, the
capacity expansion problem has a fundamentally different
structure because of the nature of available alternatives and
the sequence of decisions.
First, the nature of alternatives and corresponding tradeoffs
are different. At existing airports, short-term and medium-
term congestion mitigation options are available as alternatives
to infrastructure expansion. Operational enhancements can
be deployed to alleviate the magnitude and/or the costs of
flight delays. Demand management can better match airline
demand with available capacity at busy airports. It is worth
noting that the trade-offs associated with demand management
differ from those associated with other options, since capac-
Fig. 3: The decision tree for a brownfield capacity expansion project
with different trade-offs and path dependencies
ity expansion and operational enhancements increase either
potential or effective airport capacity. All stakeholders can
benefit (especially when ATFM and ATC algorithms incorpo-
rate equity considerations). This, however, has a development
and implementation cost. In contrast, demand management
imposes lower implantation costs, but higher economic costs
due to the scheduling constraints that it creates. Integrating
operational and economic considerations into the decision-
making problem provides decision-makers with a more com-
plete understanding of the available options.
Second, the timing and sequencing of decisions is more
complex. As in the case of a greenfield airport, alternatives to
capacity expansion have much shorter implementation time-
frames. For instance, innovative traffic management proce-
dures and demand management mechanisms could be imple-
mented successfully in a few months. The path-dependencies
in these alternatives are not primarily technical or design-
related, as in the case of infrastructure expansion, but are social
and organizational. The implementation of a new traffic man-
agement technology may require extensive integration with the
existing air traffic management systems. Demand management
may spur airlines investments in equipment and modified flight
schedules in response to changes in the regulatory environ-
ment. Early decisions in non-expansion alternatives may thus
restrict the set of future interventions, as represented by the
dashed lines corresponding to patch changes in Figure 3.
Third, the alternative options are not mutually exclusive. In
fact, airports commonly simultaneously activate several levers
corresponding to these decision alternatives. For instance,
operational enhancements and infrastructure expansion—or
the absence thereof—might motivate revisions in demand man-
agement policies. As a result, infrastructure investments can
no longer be assessed independently from alternatives. This
is represented in our framework by the black, dashed arrows
between infrastructure expansion and demand management
and operational alternatives. Note that the benefits of each
decision are not decoupled. An important argument in favor
of the current demand management approach at US airports is
that any type of demand management, by reducing pressure on
airport capacity, would lower incentives to expand capacity or
to develop innovative air traffic management procedures. As
discussed in Section III-A, we argue for a more integrated
approach in this multi-dimensional decision-making problem.
One approach is to investigate capacity enhancements options,
while maintaining a degree of freedom in the design of the
demand management mechanism.
IV. CASE DISCUSSION
We now briefly discuss the approaches adopted at several
airports worldwide to address the challenges outlined in this
paper. We focus on four airport systems at different stages
of their lifecycles and in different jurisdictions. We present
successively a greenfield project (the New Delhi Indira Gandhi
Airport), two capacity expansion projects (the Charlotte Dou-
glas Airport and the London airport system) and conges-
tion mitigation at New York airports, where infrastructure
expansion is not feasible. These cases are subject to ongoing
research.
A. The Indira Gandhi Airport (DEL)
The Indira Gandhi International Airport (DEL) in India’s
capital, New Delhi, began operating as a concession-based
infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) in 2006. The
central government of India and its Planning Commission
wanted to address the poor state of the Indian aviation sector
under the public sector operator, and resorted to airport pri-
vatization. This case is an example of changing institutional
field as the government created new laws and regulations
to enable private sector participation in airport investment,
management and operations. The project involved investment
in new runways, and international and domestic terminals,
while maintaining operations at the old terminals. On the
whole, the project is more greenfield than brownfield because
of the extent of capacity investments and dramatic overhaul
in technology and operations. Although the planning process
dated back to 1998, the 30-year concession agreement was
signed in 2006 with construction and ramp up ending in 2010.
The total project cost exceeded its approved budget of $1.46
billion by approximately 40%, resulting in very high passenger
taxes and fees as well as high landing fees for airlines. This
has raised questions regarding the design of the airport. But it
has served dramatic increases in demand since 2006, thereby
enhancing social welfare in the capital region. As a fast track
project, the airport company completed DEL in 37 months
and achieved an important reputational and policy objective
as it became operational in time for the 2010 Commonwealth
Games [56].
B. The Charlotte Douglas Airport
The Charlotte Douglas International Airport is a one of the
ten busiest airports in the United States. The airport underwent
the construction of Runway 18R|36L in 2007, which opened
in January 2010 for traffic. The final cost of the project ($325
million) exceeded its original estimate ($90 million) by a
factor of three and a half. The federal government funded
approximately 40% of the project; the rest was funded through
a $3 fee added to the cost of each ticket. Interestingly, the
opening of the runway resulted in a large surge in demand.
Approximately 8% more flights were operated in 2011 and
2012 than before new runway was opened, even though the
nation-wide demand for air travel has declined over the same
period of time. The ex post assessment of the project suggests
that infrastructure expansion has resulted in an increase in
effective capacity by 5% to 15%. Whereas this capacity
increase does alleviate current and future congestion, mild
demand management measures may have acheived larger delay
reductions [57].
C. The London Airport System (LHR, LGW)
The London area is served by two primary airports:
Heathrow and Gatwick, as well as three secondary airports:
City, Luton and Stansted. These airports are capacity con-
strained, highly congested, and impact the local environment
with noise and greenhouse gas pollutants. Heathrow is con-
sidered effectively full, and Gatwick operates at more than
85% of its maximum capacity; the others are expected to
operate at full capacity by 2030. A “do nothing” strategy will
cost the regional economy an estimated £18 billion in direct
economic impacts, and up to £45 billion in wider indirect
impacts. UK’s Airport Commission has recently evaluated
52 different proposals including short- to mid-term options
covering operational enhancements, scheduling changes and
regulatory interventions, as well as longer-term options includ-
ing new runways or a new greenfield airport. Given the high
underlying demand, investments in additional airport capacity
were recommended. New runway options currently look the
most attractive for delivering more capacity in the long-term,
with one runway design possibility at Gatwick and two design
concepts for Heathrow shortlisted for further assessment [58].
While the option of a greenfield airport is still on the table, it
presents some significant challenges and a possible cost of 5
times that of the new runway options.
D. The New York Airport System (JFK, EWR, LGA)
New York City is served by three primary commercial
airports: JFK, Newark (EWR) and LaGuardia (LGA). These
airports are subject to large—and growing—local and interna-
tional demand. At the same time, their capacity is limited by
existing infrastructure and the congestion of the surrounding
airspace. In contrast to the London system, any type of phys-
ical infrastructure expansion is infeasible in New York City.
Two options therefore remain available: demand management
and operational enhancements.
Since the phase-out of the High Density Rule, effective
January 1, 2007, JFK, EWR and LGA are subject to schedule
limits stemming from temporary orders from the Federal Avia-
tion Administration. However, these limits were found too high
to effectively mitigate congestion and it was recommended that
they be reexamined [59, 60, 16]. More broadly, the question
of effective demand management in the New York area raises
important questions on the long-term costs and benefits to the
aviation sector and the broader public [41, 42, 61] and remains
an open question. At the same time, New York airports have
implemented innovative procedures to alleviate the delay costs
at the operational level. Most important, departure metering
techniques have effectively reduced surface congestion, hence
the environmental footprint of airport operations, while im-
proving the level of service provided to air travelers. However,
the benefits of such operational measures are limited when
demand exceeds capacity by any substantial margin.
In conclusion, the New York airport system suffers from a
lack of scalability. Congestion mitigation requires the imple-
mentation of a demand management mechanism or operational
enhancements—or a combination thereof.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have critically reviewed and integrated
the literature on investments under uncertainty, airport demand
management, and airport operating procedures. We have pro-
posed an integrated framework for the planning, management
and operations of airport infrastructure that underscores the
complex interdependencies between different levers and sys-
tem performance, characterized by several “ilities”. We have
then proposed a dynamic framework for infrastructure invest-
ments that highlights the roles of uncertainty and learning and
the importance of carefully investigating available alternatives,
including policy, managerial and operational interventions. We
have finally applied this framework in a combined presentation
of four cases of airports in Delhi, Charlotte, London and New
York subject to ongoing research.
In light of the discussion provided in this paper, we can
draw several recommendations towards a systems approach
to the problems of planning, managing and operating airport
infrastructure.
• Engage with relevant stakeholders and identify the objec-
tives of the infrastructure system
• Identify the sources and extents of uncertainty surround-
ing the system
• Identify and invest in opportunities for learning
• Identify the sources of uncertainty that might be alleviated
through increased flexibility in the design of the system
• Identify clearly the alternatives to the infrastructure in-
vestment, including demand management and operational
enhancements, and the trade-offs associated with them
• Invest in existing approaches to optimizing each alterna-
tive
• Develop and invest in original approaches to integrating
all alternatives
• Engage in post-implementation assessments and make
revisions, whenever possible and necessary
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